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Abstract. The Kalam Cosmological Argument is perhaps the most
solid and widly discussed argument for a caused creation of the uni-
verse. The usual objections to the argument mainly focus on the
second premise. In this paper we discuss the dependency of the
first premise on the topological structure of the space-time manifold
adopted for the underlying cosmological model. It is shown that
in chronology-violating space-times the first premise is also violated.
The chronology-violation, in turn, requires a massive violation of the
so-called energy conditions which could have observational effects
that are briefly discussed here. Hence, astronomical observations
could be relevant for the validity of the metaphysical argument. In
this sense, it is possible to talk of “observational theology”.
1. Introduction
The so-called Kalam Cosmological Argument (e.g. Craig 1979) is a version
of the classical cosmological argument based on some medieval Islamic
arguments against the infinitude of the past. In modern syllogistic form it
can be formulated as follows:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
It has been argued that the first premise is a fundamental metaphysical
principle which cannot be intelligibly denied and that the second premise
is supported by modern cosmology, in such a way that the conclusion of
the argument is true (Craig 1979, Craig & Smith 1993). These contentions
have been discussed in recent years by several philosophers, notably Adolf
Gu¨nbaum, who argued that the Big Bang model does not support the
second premise (e.g. Gru¨nbaum 1989, 1990, 1991, 2000, and some replies
in Craig 1991 and 1992). The first premise, on the contrary, has not
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been considered controversial except from the point of view of quantum
mechanics (see the discussions in Craig & Smith 1993).
In this paper we shall argue that the validity of the first premise de-
pends on the topology of space-time manifold adopted for the cosmologi-
cal model. Multiple connected space-times can be compatible with objects
that obey all physical laws but violate the first premise of the Kalam Cos-
mological Argument. Some semantic comments are in order first to clarify
the meaning of the expression “to begin to exist”.
2. A semantical note
Craig (1992) attributes to Gru¨nbaum the implicit use of the following def-
inition:
“x begins to exist”=def. “x exists at time t and there are instants of
time immediately prior to t at which x does not exist”.
This definition is objected because it is difficult to accept that the
existence of x at t can entail the existence of temporal instants prior to t.
Admittedly, in the context of a relational theory of space-time (e.g. Perez-
Bergliaffa, Romero & Vucetich 1998) the requirement of the existence of
moments prior to t is nothing else than the requirement of the existence
of objects other than x before x. Such a definition, then, is not adequate
to the discussion of the origin of the system formed by all things, i.e. the
universe. Craig, in turn, proposes:
“x begins to exist”=def. “x exists at time t and there are no instants
of time immediately prior to t at which x exists”.
This allows for a beginning of time itself and is apparently apt for
a discussion on the beginning of the universe. But it has the problem
of demanding a sharp edge for the existence of x. Anything created by
an evolutionary process lasting a finite time interval is excluded. Let us
consider, for example, the Mankind. It certainly exists now and it certainly
did not exist 50 million years ago, but can we point out an instant t at
which it did existed and an immediately prior instant at which it did not?.
Not only biological counterexamples are possible, but we can think also in
most physical systems, like a star or a molecular cloud, which are formed
by a slow transition from a previous state.
In order to remove this problem we propose:
“x begins to exist”=def. “x exists at time t and there is a time interval
∆t ≥ 0 such that there are no instants of time immediately prior to t−∆t
at which x exists”.
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For ∆t = 0 we recover Craig’s definition. In what follows we shall
understand “to begin to exist” in the sense of this latter definition.
3. Chronology-violating space-times and self-existent objects
A relativistic space-time is represented by a four-dimensional manifold M
equipped with a Lorentzian metric gab. The General Theory of Relativity
requires the manifold to be continuous and differentiable but not specific
constraints are imposed on the details of its topology. Usually, simply
connected manifolds are considered, but multiply connected ones cannot
be ruled out only on a priori grounds.
In recent years there has been a sustained interest in multiple con-
nected space-times, also called wormhole space-times, originated in the
fact that close timelike curves (CTCs) naturally appear in them (e.g. Mor-
ris, Thorne & Yurtsever 1988, Thorne 1992). These curves represent the
world lines of any physical system in a temporally orientable space-time
that, moving always in the future direction, ends arriving back at some
point of its own past. Any space-time with CTCs is called a chronology-
violating space-time. Objections to the formation of CTCs in the real
universe had been formulated by a number of scientists, most notably by
Hawking (1992), but in the absence of a theory of quantum gravity the
possibility of wormholes in space-time cannot be ruled out (see the discus-
sions and references in Earman 1995a, Romero & Torres 2001, and Nahin
1999).
One of the most strange implications of chronology-violating space-
times is the possibility of an ontology with self-existent objects. These
are physical systems “trapped” in CTCs. Romero & Torres (2001), who
have discussed these systems in depth, give the following toy-example to
illustrate the nature of such objects:
Suppose that, in a space-time where CTCs exist, a time traveler takes
a ride on a time machine carrying a book with her. She goes back to the
past, forgets the book in -what will be- her laboratory, and returns to the
future. The book remains then hidden until the time traveler finds it just
before starting her time trip, carrying the book with her.
The book in question is a self-existent object: it exists at a given
t, there exists ∆t ≥ 0 such that the object does not exist at t − ∆t,
but, however, there is not an external cause of its existence. The self-
existent object is just a feature of space-time itself, it is not either created
or destroyed in space-time. Such objects clearly violate the first premise
of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.
It is very important to emphasize that, despite that the self-existent
objects have not a cause of their existence, they do not violate causality.
In fact, since their space-time history is a continuous closed curve, their
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physical state at every time t is casually linked to a previous state. In this
way, these objects are not causally created, but they have a finite existence
in the sense that they exist during a finite time interval, and their existence
does not violate strict causality.
Romero & Torres (2001) have argued against an ontology of self-
existent objects invocating a full Principle of Self-Consistency for all laws
of nature. This principle, which is used to dissolve the so-called “para-
doxes” of time travel (Earman 1995b, Nahin 1999), can be stated as:
The laws of nature are such that any local solution of their equations
that represents a feature of the real universe must be extendible to a global
solution.
Romero and Torres suggest that this principle is a metanomological
statement (see Bunge 1961) that enforces the harmony between local and
global affairs in space-time. By including thermodynamics in the consis-
tency analysis of the motion of macroscopic systems through wormhole
space-times, they have shown that non-interacting self-existent objects are
not possible in the real universe because energy degradation along the CTC
results in non-consistent histories.
Notwithstanding these objections, the development of consistent histo-
ries remains an open possibility for isolated systems where entropy cannot
be defined (e.g. single particles) and for interacting systems where their
energy degradation is exactly compensated by external work made upon
them (Lossev & Novikov 1992). Hence, if CTCs actually occur in the uni-
verse, there seems to be no form to avoid the possibility of at least some
types of self-existent objects.
Very recently, J. Richard Gott III and Li-Xin Li (1998) have even
proposed that the universe itself could be a self-existent object. Form a
philosophical point of view, this would be a violation of both premises
of the Kalam Cosmological Argument with a single counterexample. As
far as it can be seen, the work by Gott and Li is consistent with the Big
Bang paradigm. They only require the existence of a multiply connected
space-time with a CTC region beyond the original inflationary state.
A key point for the validity of the first premise of the Kalam Cos-
mological Argument is that the space-time in the real universe must be
described by a simply connected manifold, with no CTCs 1. Otherwise,
the presence of objects that have “began to exist” without external cause
but notwithstanding are subject to causality cannot be excluded. We have,
then, two possibilities in order to explore the validity of the first premise
in the context of its dependency on the underlying topology of space-time:
1Formally, CTCs are possible even in simply connected space-times, but these kind of
solutions of Einstein field equations, like the classical Go¨del (1949) rotating universe,
are thought to be not applicable to the real world.
Chronology violation and the Cosmological Argument 5
1) we can try to prove, from basic physical laws, that CTCs cannot be
formed in the real universe (i.e. we can try to find out a mechanism to en-
force chronology protection), or 2) we can inquire about the observational
signatures of wormhole structures in space-time and try to test through
observations the hypothesis that natural wormholes actually do exist. The
first option requires a full theory of Quantum Gravity, something that
is beyond our present knowledge. The second approach is being already
explored by some scientists.
4. Observational signatures of WEC-violating matter
Macroscopic and static wormhole structures as those necessary to allow the
formation of CTCs require that the average null energy condition (ANEC)
be violated in the wormhole throat. This condition is part of the so-called
energy conditions of Einstein gravity, which are very general hypothesis
designed to provide as much information as possible on a wide variety of
physical systems without specifying a particular equation of state. These
conditions are not proved from basic principles, they are just conjectures,
which can be very useful in some contexts. However, many violating sys-
tems are known, including the universe itself (see Visser 1996).
The energy conditions violated by traversable wormhole can be put in
terms of the stress-energy tensor of the matter threading the wormhole as
ρ + p ≥ 0, where ρ is the energy density and p is the total pressure. This
implies also a violation of the so-called weak energy condition –WEC– (ρ ≥
0 ∧ ρ+ p ≥ 0; see Visser 1996 for details, also Morris and Thorne 1988).
Plainly stated, all this means that the matter threading the wormhole must
exert gravitational repulsion in order to stay stable against collapse. If
natural wormholes exist in the universe (e.g. if the original topology after
the Big-Bang was multiply connected), then there should be observable
signatures of the interactions between matter with negative energy density
with the normal matter.
At astronomical level the most important observational consequence
of the existence of natural wormholes is gravitational lensing of background
sources (Cramer et al. 1995, Torres et al. 1998; Eiroa et al. 2001, Safonova
et al. 2001). There are very specific features produced by chromaticity
effects in lensing of extended sources that could be used to differentiate
events produced by wormholes from those of other objects (Eiroa et al.
2001). In the wormhole microlensing case there are two intensity peaks
during each event separated by an umbra region. On the contrary, in the
normal case there is a single, time-symmetric peak. In addition, in the
wormhole case it can be shown that there is a spectral break that is not
observed in the usual case (Eiroa et al. 2001 for details).
Also, the macrolensing effects upon a background field of galaxies pro-
duced by large-scale violations of the energy conditions are observationally
distinguishable from the normal macrolensing by either dark or luminous
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matter concentrations (see Safonova et al. 2001 for complete numerical
simulations of macrolensed galaxy fields). In particular, it can be shown
that for positive mass we see concentric arcs, whereas for negative energy
densities we have filamentary features projected from the center.
The above examples are enough to illustrate the kind of observational
effects that can be expected in an universe with multiple connected topol-
ogy. Whether such space-time wormholes actually exist in our universe is
something that has to be found yet.
The mere existence of a multiple connected topology for space-time
does not warrant, by itself, the violation of the first premise of the Kalam
Cosmological Argument. But it makes possible the formation of CTCs and
non-cronal situations in that space-time, hence opening the possibility of
an ontology with self-existent objects. This implies that the universality of
the premise can be objected even at a macroscopic level, without resorting
to quantum considerations.
5. Conclusions: Theology meets experiment
The first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument, namely that “what-
ever that begins to exist has a cause of its existence”, is not a self-evident,
universally valid statement as it is usually accepted. We have shown that
the truth value of the premise is dependent on some basic characteristics
of the space-time manifold that represents the real universe. In particu-
lar, multiple connected space-times can accommodate objects that exist by
themselves, without external cause, but also without any local violation of
causality. These objects “begin to exist” in accordance to even the most
restrictive definitions given in Section 2.
Since the connectivity of space-time can be probed through astronom-
ical observations (see Anchordoqui et al. 1999 for an example of these
observational studies), the validity of the Kalam Cosmological Argument
can be tested by the scientific method. Not only the second premise, which
uses to be discussed in the light of the Big Bang cosmology, but also the
first premise of the argument is susceptible to experimental test. It is in
this more extended sense that in the Kalam Cosmological Argument we
can say that theology meets experiment.
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